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CHAPTER 25 
Labor Relations 
ROBERT M. SEGAL 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§25.1. State-federal jurisdiction,1 Although some of the doubt 
which has surrounded the "twilight zone" of federal-state regulation 
of labor relations has been dispelled by several new decisions by the 
United States Supreme Court, the twilight zone remains. The Court 
in three cases 2 held that the states have no power to act in the reg-
ulated area "affecting commerce" even when the National Labor 
Relations Board has declined or obviously would decline to exercise its 
jurisdiction. In the Cuss case, the Court held that the Utah Labor 
Relations Board does not have jurisdiction over an unfair labor 
practice case against an employer engaged in interstate commerce, 
even though the NLRB has declined jurisdiction under its monetary 
jurisdictional standards.3 In the Fairlawn case, the Court held that 
a state court may not enjoin peaceful picketing of an interstate com-
merce employer by a union that is seeking a union shop clause but 
which does not represent a majority of the employees; this question 
is covered by federal law in spite of the fact that the NLRB would 
decline jurisdiction of the dispute under its own standards. Finally, 
in the Carmon case the Court held that a state court does not have 
jurisdiction in an action for damages and for an injunction restrain-
ing a minority union from peaceful picketing for a union shop 
of an interstate employer, even though the NLRB would not assert 
jurisdiction.4 
ROBERT M. SEGAL is a partner in the firm of Segal and Flamm, Boston. He is 
a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars and is Legal Counsel of the 
Massachusetts Federation of Labor. He served as Chairman of the Section on 
Labor Relations Law of the American Bar Association in 1956 and is Co-chairman 
of the Labor-Management Relations Committee of the Boston Bar Association. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Robert M. Laprade, mem-
ber of the Board of Student Editors, in the preparation of this chapter. 
§25.1. 1 Garner v. Teamsters, 346 U.S. 485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, 98 L. Ed. 228 
(1953); see 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.l; 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.2. 
2 Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. I, 77 Sup. Ct. 598, I L. Ed. 2d 
601 (1957); Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen v. Fairlawn Meats, 
Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 77 Sup. Ct. 604, I L. Ed. 2d 613 (1957); San Diego Building 
Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26, 77 Sup. Ct. 607, I L. Ed. 2d 618 (1957). 
3 See NLRB Press ReI. No. R-445, issued July I, 1954. See also Breeding 
Transfer Co., llO N.L.R.B. 493, 35 L.R.R.M. 1020 (1954); Humphrey, The Changing 
Jurisdictional Standards of the NLRB, 15 Fed. B.J. 30 (1955). 
4 In several other cases the Supreme Court by per curiam decisions reversed 
state courts and held that they were without power to act: 
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The effect of these decisions was well summarized by the Chief 
Justice in the Cuss case when he stated: 
We are told by appellee that to deny the State jurisdiction 
here will create a vast no-man's-land, subject to regulation by 
no agency or court. We are told by appellant that to grant juris-
diction would produce confusion and conflicts with federal policy. 
Unfortunately, both may be right.1I 
In Massachusetts, these decisions mean that the Massachusetts Labor 
Relations Commission has no jurisdiction over employers whose ac-
tivities affect interstate commerce but who cannot go to the NLRB 
because they do not meet the jurisdictional standards of the Board. 
Inasmuch as the Massachusetts Labor Relations Law 6 does not con-
form to the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, the NLRB 
cannot cede jurisdiction to the state board. In effect, the MLRC and 
other state labor relations boards are out of business except for 
voluntary submissions or the ill-defined and fairly unpromising de 
minimis situations. 
The state courts are also restricted in their control over the field 
of labor relations. State courts are powerless to enjoin the whole 
gamut of labor activities which are "covered" by the Taft-Hartley 
Act. If the activity is protected by Section 7 of the act or is an unfair 
labor practice under Section 8, state courts have no jurisdiction 
except possibly over suits for damages for violence.7 Furthermore, 
employees in the unregulated area have none of the rights guaranteed 
by Section 7 or the protections of Section 8 (a), while labor organiza-
tions in this area are free of the restrictions of Section 8(b). To remedy 
these various situations, federal legislation is needed. 
The doubt as to the enforcement of collective agreements in the 
federal courts 8 was resolved in Textile Workers Union of America 
(a) Jurisdictional picketing which violated the state's secondary boycott sta-
tute. Pocatello Building and Construction Trades Council v. C. H. Elle Construction 
Co., 352 U.s. 884, 77 Sup. Ct. 130, 1 L. Ed. 2d 82 (1956). 
(b) Picketing for organizational purposes or to compel a contract after a 
NLRB finding of no unfair refusal to bargain. Retail Clerks v. J. J. Newberry Co., 
352 u.s. 987, 77 Sup. Ct. 385, 1 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1957). 
(c) Picketing to induce the employer to employ union labor in violation of 
the state's right-to-work law. Local 429, Electrical Workers v. Farnsworth & 
Chambers, 353 u.s. 969, 77 Sup. Ct. 1056, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1133 (1957). 
(d) Refusal of employees of a common carrier to cross a picket line, a refusal 
which was held by the state court to be violation of state law. Teamsters Local 327 
v. Kerrigan Iron Works, 353 U.S. 968, 77 Sup. Ct. 1055, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1133 (1957). 
1\ 353 U.S. I, 10,77 Sup. Ct. 598, 603,1 L. Ed. 2d 601, 607 (1957). 
6 General Laws, c. 150A, §1O(b) does not affect the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court on federal pre·emption. 
7 United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 u.s. 
266,76 Sup. Ct. 794, 100 L. Ed. 1162 (1956). On the question of damages, see United 
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 74 Sup. Ct. 
833, 98 L. Ed. 1025 (1954); the question of damages was expressly left open in the 
Fairlawn and Garmon cases, note 2 supra. 
8 For a discussion of this issue, see 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.2. 
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v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama 9 and two companion cases,10 wherein 
the United States Supreme Court held that arbitration provisions in 
collective bargaining agreements affecting interestate commerce are 
enforceable in the federal courts under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley 
Act, irrespective of the law of the state in which the controversy arises. 
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissenting opinion in the 
Lincoln Mills case, Section 301 has been "transmuted into a mandate 
to the federal courts to fashion a whole body of substantive federal 
law appropriate for the complicated and touchy problems raised by 
collective bargaining." 11 This case raises some important questions 
relative to state labor law and courts: (1) Has the federal government 
taken exclusive hold of the field of labor arbitration? (2) May a 
suit also be brought in a state court for the enforcement of an agree-
ment to arbitrate under a labor agreement? (3) Will the federal 
courts look to state law in fashioning federal law on a case-by-case 
basis? 12 Professor Paul Hays of Columbia University Law School 
concludes: 
... state laws are no longer applicable to contracts between em-
ployers and labor organizations representing employees in an 
industry affecting commerce. State courts which rule upon such 
contracts will be required to rule in accordance with the new 
federal law which the federal courts will now proceed to fashion . 
. . . It will be some time before the full implications of the Lincoln 
Mills decision are recognized. In the meantime, there will be an 
unparalleled opportunity for counsel in the state and federal 
courts and for commentators to make an imaginative contribu-
tion to the new federal law which the courts must fashion.13 
§25.2. Massachusetts decisions. During the 1957 SURVEY year the 
Supreme Judicial Court delivered only two decisions in the field 
of labor relations; it also decided sixteen workmen's compensation 
cases. 1 
In Leonard v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Railway CO.2 the Court 
considered federal jurisdiction no obstacle to its entertaining an action 
on behalf of discharged employees for a declaration of their right 
under a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate the issue of their 
9353 U.S. 448, 77 Sup. Ct. 912, 1 L. Ed. 2d 972 (1957). 
10 Goodall·Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of America, AFL, Local 1802. 
353 U.S. 550. 77 Sup. Ct. 920. 1 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (1957); General Electric Co. v. 
Local 205", United Electrical Workers of America. 353 U.S. 547, 77 Sup. Ct. 921. 1 
L. Ed. 2d 1028 (1957). 
11353 U.S. 448. 461. 77 Sup. Ct. 912. 923.1 L. Ed. 2d 972. 983 (1957). 
12 For a detailed discussion of these and related questions, see Isaacson. Report 
of the Committee on Labor Arbitration, Proceedings A.B.A., Section of Labor 
Relations Law, 55 (1957). 
13 Hays, Report of the Committee on State Labor Legislation, id. at p. 105. 
§25.2. IThe cases on workmen's compensation are covered in Chapter 30. 
2335 Mass. 308, 140 N.E.2d 187 (1957). 
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discharge, although the issue of discharge had already been passed 
upon by the NLRB, which had held that no unfair labor practice 
had been committed. 
In Binnall v. Thayer Co.S the union sought to review earlier final 
injunctive decrees of the Court in Thayer Co. v. Binnall 4 on the 
grounds that the decrees were in conflict with and superseded by a 
decision of the NLRB 5 and that the field had been pre-empted by 
federal law. The Court held that since there was no report of the 
evidence and the trial court had found that "no new facts have been 
presented and there has been no significant change of circumstances 
since the granting and upholding of the final decrees," 6 the finding 
was decisive and the leave to file a bill of review was not allowed. 
As an original case or on a full report of the evidence, there is some 
question as to whether the original decree would be valid in the light 
of new federal-state developments.7 
Although there has been no decision by the full bench of the Su-
preme Judicial Court on the amended anti-injunction law of the 
Commonwealth,S a decision is expected soon on the basis of the report 
to the full bench by Justice Ronan in the case of Poirier v. Justices 
of the Superior Court.9 In this case the unions peacefully picketed 
an employer, none of whose employees were members of the union, 
for informational and possibly organizational purposes. Although 
the bill of complaint alleged interstate commerce, Judge Goldberg 
in a special hearing on a plea to the jurisdiction based on the Supreme 
Court decisions in the Guss, Fairlawn, and Garmon cases,1° found that 
there was no interstate commerce involved and that there was no 
"labor dispute" within the meaning of the state anti-injunction law.u 
When the judge refused to report the case under G.L., c. 214, §9A(6), 
the unions, relying on Mengel v. Justices of the Superior Court,12 
sought a writ of mandamus and Judge Ronan has reported the ques-
tion as to whether there is a labor dispute under the laws of Massa-
chusetts to the full bench of the Court. 
S 335 Mass. 150, 138 N.E.2d 765 (1956). 
4326 Mass. 467, 473n, 95 N.E.2d 193 (1950). 
1$ H. N. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1952), enforcement granted, 213 F.2d 748 
(1st Cir. 1954). 
6326 Mass. 467, 473, 95 N.E.2d 193, 198 (1950). 
7 See §25.1 supra. 
S Acts of 1950, c. 452. See Segal, The New Anti-Injunction Law, 21 Boston B. 
Bull. 155 (1950). 
9 C. L. No. 57161 (Oct. 1957). 
10 See §25.l supra, note 2. 
11 But d. Capitol Super Market v. McNamara, Suffolk Sup. Ct. Eq. 67757 (1954). 
Judge Spalding sitting as a single justice held that a "labor dispute" existed and 
the procedural requirements of Chapter 214 applied in a case of peaceful picket-
ing of an establishment in which none of the employees were members of the 
union. 
1231!1 Mass. 238, 47 N.E.2d 3 (1943). 
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B. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§25.3 
§25.3. The new Health, Welfare and Retirement Funds law.1 The 
last act signed by Governor Furcolo in the 1957 session of the General 
Court was Chapter 778, "An Act Establishing a Health, Welfare and 
Retirement Funds Board and Regulating Such Funds in the Common-
wealth." Joining several other states,2 Massachusetts has adopted a 
broad registration and reporting law as a result of various investiga-
tions of health and welfare funds.3 
The new law does not become effective until October 1, 1958, and 
in the interim the Special Commission Established to Study and 
Investigate the Need for Administration and Regulation of Health 
and Welfare Trust Funds in the Commonwealth will continue its 
investigation and has been directed to make a final report by De-
cember, 1958.4 
Administration. A board consisting of the Commissioners of Labor 
and Industries, of Banks and of Insurance will administer the new 
law. It has broad powers to adopt rules and regulations, require re-
ports, employ personnel, pass on registration of funds, require posting 
of bonds, receive the annual filings of the funds, require distribution 
of the summary of the annual report to all employers, employees, and 
unions, examine trusts after notice to the trust with approval of the 
probate judge, subpoena witnesses, and bring suits against trustees 
when after notice and hearing, it finds that the trust has been depleted 
by the wrongful or negligent act of a trustee or any person connected 
with the trust. 
Coverage. The new law applies to all funds derived in whole or in 
part from contributions from employers or employees, or both, for 
the purpose of employee benefits directly, or through insurance, for 
medical or hospital care, pensions, annuities, retirement, death or 
unemployment benefits, compensation for injuries or illness, life in-
surance, disability and sickness or accident insurance. The new law 
applies to joint health and welfare or pension funds administered 
by employer and union representatives and already subject to Section 
302 (c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947; to unilateral 
§25.3. 1 Acts of 1957, c. 778, creating a new Chapter 151D in the General Laws. 
For a detailed analysis of the new law, see Segal, The New Health and Welfare 
Act of Massachusetts, I Boston B.J. No. II, p. II (1957). 
2 California, Connecticut, New York, Washington and Wisconsin passed such 
laws in 1956 or 1957. 
3 In Massachusetts, an unpaid Special Commission established by Resolves of 
1955, c. 107, was revived and continued by Resolves of 1956, c. 59, and further con-
tinued by Resolves of 1956, c. 156, and Resolves of 1957, c. II3. It has made five 
interim reports, two of the most important being Senate No. 675 (1957) and Senate 
No. 690 (1957). Other investigations in the field of health and welfare funds in-
clude four major investigations by Congressional committees, and state investiga-
tions in California, Minnesota, New York and Washington. 
4 Resolves of 1957, c. 113. 
5
Segal: Chapter 25: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1957
§25.3 LABOR RELATIONS 173 
pension funds set up by employers and already subject to Sections 
401 and 404 of the Internal Revenue Code; to supplementary unem-
ployment compensation funds, and pre-Taft-Hartley health and wel-
fare retirement funds set up by unions and based on contributions 
from employers; to health and welfare or pension funds operated as 
corporations; to national out-of-state funds so long as there are 
twenty-five or more beneficiaries in the Commonwealth. 
The law does not apply to union mortuary funds or other union 
funds where the contributions do not come from employers. The 
law specifically exempts funds with less than twenty-five beneficiaries 
in Massachusetts, funds established by the state government or any of 
its political subdivisions, and any employees' retirement association 
established by law subject to an audit by the Commissioner of In-
surance or the Commissioner of Banks. It also does not apply to 
ordinary profit-sharing plans of corporations. Opinions of the Attorney 
General or statutory changes by the 1958 session of the General Court 
are needed to clarify many problems raised by the definitions in the 
law.1i 
Obligations of Funds. By January 1, 1959, all covered funds must 
register with the Board. The Board will approve any trust provided 
that in its opinion the documents regulating the fund make adequate 
provisions for its investment and operation, for the interests of the 
beneficiaries, and for an accounting. If the Board disapproves the 
registration, the fund has twenty days to make amendments and can 
go to the Probate Court for review. 
The funds must file detailed annual reports with the Board. The 
reports must include amounts contributed by employers or employees, 
the amount of benefits paid, the number of employees covered, the 
salaries and fees paid and to whom. If the benefits are provided 
through an insurance or service company, the carrier must supply the 
fund with extensive financial and administrative information. 
"Kickbacks" are prohibited by the new law; no trustee or employer 
or labor union or their officers or agents can receive any payments 
directly or indirectly from any insurance company, agent, broker, or 
the trust. This does not prohibit unions or employers from receiving 
reasonable compensation from the fund for necessary services ren-
dered or for expenses. 
1\ Although the new law uses such terms as "trust," "trustees," and "benefi-
ciaries," the interchangeable use of the words "funds," "plans," and "programs" by 
the Special Commission and in the exclusions under Section 6, as well as the in-
exactly drafted definitions, permits the interpretation that the law will apply to 
many unilateral benefit plans that have no trust corpus in the usual sense. Thus it 
is arguable that the law applies to an employer who buys workmen's compensation, 
life, sickness or accident insurance for his employees; who buys Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield; or who pays sick leave or sets up a medical department in his plant_ It 
can also be argued that the law even applies to the "funds" of Blue Cross-Blue 
Shield and of insurance companies. 
6
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Trustees are held responsible in a fiduciary capacity for all prop-
erty of the trust. In spite of any exculpatory clauses in the trust 
instrument, the new law imposes a duty to use good faith or due 
care in administering the trust. 
Criminal penalties of up to five years in prison and of fines up to 
$10,000 are provided for embezzlement or misappropriation of trust 
property, falsification or destruction of records, filing false statements 
or taking "kickbacks." 
Criticisms. The new law is open to several criticisms.6 Technically 
the definitions are poor, the standards vague, and there is a lack of 
reciprocity or waiver for federal or other state laws. Some critics 
argue that there was no evidence to require the broad coverage or 
detailed requirements of the new law. Others point out that there 
should be a federal law in this field rather than forty-eight different 
state laws. Some segments of labor also criticize the new law because 
of its omissions: 7 it provides for (I) no regulation of insurance abuses; 
(2) no removal of the requirements of mandatory payment or charge 
of brokerage commissions even though no service was rendered; (3) 
no provision for strengthening the insurance laws; (4) no provision 
for any reduction in premiums based on pro rata contributions by 
employees; (5) no regulation of profit-sharing plans or the invest-
ment of trust funds in company stocks. At the same time other critics 
call for stronger regulations and the prudent-man rule for investments 
of trust funds.s These and other proposals probably will be intro-
duced in the 1958 session of the General Court. 
§25.4. Miscellaneous statutes. Unemployment compensation bene-
fits were liberalized to provide for an increase from $3 to $4 for 
dependents of unemployed workers.1 The definition of "remunera-
tion" in the Employment Security Law was changed to exclude sev-
erance payments but to apply to payments in lieu of dismissal notice.2 
This helps the long-service employee who previously lost his unem-
ployment compensation benefits because of his accrued severance 
payments. Another short-run correctional amendment 3 was passed 
providing that unemployed persons who would have been eligible for 
benefits on October I, 1956, under G.L., c. 15IA, if Chapter 719 of 
the Acts of 1956 had not been enacted creating a changing base period, 
"could receive their unemployment compensation benefits" using the 
6 See MacIntyre, Regulations of Employee Benefit Programs, 10 Indust. & Lab. 
ReI. Rev. 554 (1957); see also Segal, The New Health and Welfare Act of Massa-
chusetts, 1 Boston B.J. No. 11, pp. 11, 15-16 nn. 14-22 (1957). 
7 See AFL, Guides for Administration of Health and Welfare Funds (1955). 
S See Senate No. 675 (1957). 
§25.4. 1 Acts of 1957, c. 542, amending G.L., c. 151A, §29(c). 
2 Id., c. 632, amending G.L., c. 151A, §I(r). This definitely affects the holding in 
Kalen v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 334 Mass. 503, 136 
N.E.2d 257 (1956), discussed in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.5. 
8 Acts of 1957, c. 626. 
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old "base period" of July 1, 1955, to July I, 1956, rather than the 
new period.4 This applies only during 1957. 
Representation of labor was provided on the twelve-man advisory 
correction committee Ii and on the contributory group insurance pro-
gram of government employees_6 The compensation for expert assist-
ants used in arbitration cases was increased from $20 to $30 per 
day.7 The minimum wage law was also amended to provide for an 
extention of from 30 to 90 days for the time within which the 
minimum wage boards must submit their reports and recommenda-
tions for a minimum fair wage rate.8 With labor's sponsorship, there 
was a $300 increase in the minimum salary for public school teachers 
to a new minimum of $3300.9 The law providing for security for 
payments to laborers and subcontractors on public construction was 
strengthened,lo 
Several relaxing amendments were also passed. As in former years, 
the Commissioner of Labor and Industries was authorized to suspend 
until July 1, 1958, the operation of the labor laws relating to minors 
and women.11 The minimum wage law was amended to permit the 
Commission to issue a special license for rates below the minimum fair 
wage rates for learners, apprentices or persons in apprentice training 
programs as well as persons impaired by age, physical or mental de-
ficiency or injury.12 Furthermore, women employed in legislative 
printing or binding during the sessions of the General Court were 
exempted from the provisions of G.L., c. 149 limiting work periods 
of women.13 
Although the House passed the Uniform Arbitration Act,14 adopted 
in whole or in part in several other states,15 the Senate insisted on 
several emasculating amendments requiring courts to pass on arbitra-
bility in the first instance.16 When no compromise was reached, this 
important bill died between the branches. 
Several labor matters were referred to Special Commissions. These 
4 Acts of 1956, c. 719. 
Ii Acts of 1957, c. 704, amending G.L., c. 27, §3. 
6 Id., c. 242. 
7 Id., c. 481, amending G.L. c. 150, §7. 
8 Id., c. 202, amending G.L., c. 151, §7. 
9Id., c. 447, amending G.L., c. 71, §40. 
10 Id., c. 682, amending G.L., c. 149, §29. 
11 Id., c. 162. The Commissioner's power requires the finding of an emergency 
or a hardship. 
12 Id., c. 225, amending G.L., c. 151, §9. 
13 Id., c. 91, amending G.L., c. 149, §36. 
14 See Final Report of Department of Labor and Industries, House No. 2692 
(1957). 
15 In 1957, Minnesota adopted the Uniform Act. Florida and Maine adopted 
their own venions of the act and earlier versions of the act have been adopted in 
other states. 
16 See Journal of the Senate, June 27,1957, p. ll80; id., July 1, 1957, p. 1191; id., 
July 22, 1957, p. 1318. 
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included time and one-half for work in excess of forty hours,17 inves-
tigation of labor laws relating to women and children,18 disqualifica-
tion in the Employment Security Law,19 and continuation of investiga-
tion of health and welfare plans.2o In addition, the new Commission 
on the Audit of State Needs and Problems will study many labor 
matters.21 
17 Resolves of 1957, c. 40. 
18 Id., c. 58. 
19 Id., c. 93. 
~o Id., cc. 66, 70, 90, 113. 
21 Id., c. 38. 
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